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Abstract
A Blockchain is essentially a distributed database of records, or public ledger of all
transactions or digital events that have been executed and shared among participating
parties. Each transaction in the public ledger is verified by consensus of a majority
of the participants in the system. Once entered, information can never be erased.
This allows participating entities to know for certain that a digital event happened
by creating an irrefutable record in a public ledger. This participants are anonymous
users which can be identified under a Bitcoin address.The increased use of this cryp-
tocurrencies such as Bitcoin among private users and some businesses has opened a
new avenue of research in the field of digital forensics involving cryptocurrencies.
The anonymity of Blockchain has made cryptocurrencies a de facto standard
payment in the black market or deep web. Users who buy in this kind of services,
protect their identity by means of the natural protection provided by cryptocurrencies.
Because of this, the vast majority of payments which take place in TOR are made
through this kind of payment methods.
This paper describes the steps that should take place in a crime investigation
involving cryptocurrencies, from the alert of a crime being committed up until the
support or refute of the hypothesis and proofs before a court.
One of the most important steps is to catch or identify the identity of cryptocur-
rency users or in this case "cybercriminals". In order to achieve this, it is necessary to
try and exploit the infrastructures of both Bitcoin and TOR networks. If a positive
coincidence is found when exploiting any of previous networks, relate or link a user
to a specific Bitcoin address can help identify him in real life. After the identification
has been successful, the next step will be to examine the user’s personal data.
Once the identity has been discovered, we will make use of "deeper" Forensic
analysis, which will help maintain valid any evidence needed in order to proof a
criminal guilt before a court. This will be achieved by following a computer forensic
process which prevents original data from being altered.
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Personal Motivation
The main motivation of this project is to study one of the most relevant technologies
today and it’s possible security vulnerabilities, and once found, try and exploit them.
Blockchain is a technology fairly new to most of the population. It has not been
yet implemented in our day to day, therefore, it’s pertinent to study and understand
which are it’s vulnerabilities prior to its possible mass implementation.
One of the motivations that led me to this idea, was the study of a way of identify-
ing the growing amount of cybercriminals that use cryptocurrencies as their standard
method of payment. Since one of the main innovations of Blockchain transactions is
anonymity, I believe it is important to identify those users who use this technology
for illegal purposes.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
We are living in an era of big technological innovations with infinite positive contri-
butions, but as we know, every new IT innovation has a security requirement behind
it. This requirements get more and more demanding as offensive tools evolve and
increase in sophistication.
Since the creation of Bitcoin and later altcoins, and their respective Blockchains,
cryptocurrencies have become a fancy and very useful way of payment for many users,
which offers a fast and almost tax fee free transactions worldwide. The anonymity of
the payments and the exclusion of trusted third parties needed to verify transactions
made cryptocurrencies become a de facto standard payment in the dark web. This
tool has been increasingly used by criminals to perform illegal transactions. This
transactions majorly include:
• Drugs
– http://kbvbh4kdddiha2ht.onion/
– http://fzqnrlcvhkgbdwx5.onion/
– http://newpdsuslmzqazvr.onion/
– http://k4btcoezc5tlxyaf.onion/
– http://mlj4iyalawb2ve2u.onion/
– http://xdsa5xcrrrxxxolc.onion/
– http://abyssopyps3z4xof.onion/products
– http://mollyworh4524fop.onion/
• Guns
– http://tuu66yxvrnn3of7l.onion/
– http://drkseidwayn6uc5x.onion/catalogue.html
– http://2kka4f23pcxgqkpv.onion/
– http://q7hj46bbqorjthmq.onion/index.php/shopping/index/arms
– http://gunsdtk47tolcrre.onion/
• Pornography
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• Hackers
– http://zv2pk3rt7lspysus.onion/
– http://2ogmrlfzdthnwkez.onion/
– http://hackerrljqhmq6jb.onion/
– http://doxTORg7natnwyz5.onion/
• Hitman Contracts
– http://darkmambawopntdk.onion/
– http://yo4jmu6dsfaeekt3.onion/
– http://hitman.TORpress2sarn7xw.onion/
• Money Laundering
– https://cryptomixer.io/TOR/
– http://blenderiocpxfema.onion/
– http://coinpigih6i444lm.onion/
– http://penguinsmbshtgmf.onion/
– http://bitmixbizymuphkc.onion/en
• Ponzi Scheme (Investment with x% interest)
A report came out on 2011 where a user of Bitcointalk.org threatened the Bitcoin
community with an injection of custom data in the Blockchain.[16]
In 2013 a user named Scintill alleged to have extracted data from two transactions in
the Bitcoin Blockchain where "some Hidden Wiki pages ("Jailbait", "Hard Candy")
with links to pedo communities and stuff" had been stored.[15]
• https://Blockchain.info/tx/dde7cd8e8f073a525c16c5ee4e4a254f847b7ad6babef
257231813166fbef551
• https://Blockchain.info/tx/4a0088a249e9099d205fb4760c28275d4b8965ac9fd56
f5ddf6771cdb0d94f38
Another main issue concerning security in the Blockchain is the possibility of
theft or any other malicious attack that can be performed. A study has revealed that
every day, around $9 Million are lost to cryptocurrency scams, hacks, thefts, frauds
or phishing.1
Since the creation of Bitcoin there have been numerous thefts, it has been cal-
culated that around 18% of the total amount of cryptocurrencies have been stolen.
1This amount only takes into consideration thefts that occurred in the first half of 2018.
https://news.Bitcoin.com/9-million-day-lost-cryptocurrency-scams/
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• https://www.ccn.com/biggest-theft-history-know-far-530-million-coincheck
-hack
• http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/07/technology/nicehash-Bitcoin-theft
-hacking/index.html
• https://www.investopedia.com/news/indian-exchange-coinsecure-hit-35
-million-Bitcoin-theft
• https://coinjournal.net/uk-company-linked-to-the-theft-of-650000-Bitcoins
-from-mt-gox
• http://time.com/money/5053744/hackers-steal-Bitcoin-nicehash
• https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currency-crime/about
-1-2-billion-in-cryptocurrency-stolen-since-2017-cybercrime-group
-idUSKCN1IP2LU
• https://www.coindesk.com/unconfirmed-report-5-million-bitstamp
-Bitcoin-exchange
• https://medium.com/@MikeBacina/1b-lost-the-5-biggest-cryptocurrency
-fails-of-2017-9862131e2bf7
• https://news.Bitcoin.com/9-million-day-lost-cryptocurrency-scams
• http://fortune.com/2018/02/14/Bitcoin-cryptocurrency-Blockchain
-wallet-hack
The issues exposed above have taken experts to start investigating ways of track-
ing transactions in order to locate the responsible authors of these criminal activities.
Although some crimes have been solved, the vast majority are still unsolved.The most
renown case was Silk Road.
1.2 Scope of the Thesis
Given what has been indicated in the background, this project intends to explain at a
high level, the process since a crime has been identified up to the presentation of the
necessary evidences obtainable from the target’s (criminal) PC. For that, we will have
to discover and identify different methods to de-anonymize cybercriminals, which use
Bitcoin and TOR as their preferred exchange and network respectively. Once the
criminals have been identified, the existent frames in a client PC, where transaction
or movements inside Bitcoin’s Blockchain have taken place, will be analysed.
In order to achieve this, its crucial to completely identify the user that is behind a
certain Bitcoin address. The following will be studied and explained: What is Bitcoin
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and Blockchain and how do they work, what is TOR and how does it work, techniques
to de-anonymize this kind of users and once identified, which are the relevant frames
for the investigation and how to gain access to them.
1.3 State of the Art
We will summarize the state of the art of the three main aspects of this study. In
this point, we will give a brief historical explanation of the technology and which is
the current state of this.
The three main points of study of the project are:
• Cryptocurrencies
• Anonymous Communications
• Digital Forensics
1.3.1 Cyrptocurrencies
Digital currencies based on public key cryptography, cryptocurrencies, differ from
other types of currencies as they are able to provide pseudonymity naturally. There
are several notable examples of pseudonymous cryptocurrencies.
E-cash - Ecash was presented in 1983 by David Chaum, who introduced blind sig-
natures and ecash [23], an anonymous payment system based on them. Coins were
issued by a bank which were blindly signed and didn’t belong to a specfici user. This
made the coins anonymous. Ecash was implemented by “DigiCash” company in 1989.
Despite some initial success the company went bankrupt in 1998 (one of the possible
reasons is the wide adoption of credit cards for online payments).
Ecash was a centralized digital currency as there is one problem which is not easy
to solve without introducing a trusted third party: double spending. In contrast to
physical cash, electronic coins are very easy to copy. Thus the common solution for
a merchant is to consult with the bank to make sure that a coin was not previously
spent.
B-money - B-money was presented in 1998 byWei Dai[24], as a design for distributed
digital currency. It included several important ideas:
• Both parties hide their identities behind public keys.
• Anyone can create money by broadcasting the solution to a previously unsolved
computational problem.
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• In order to transfer money, a user needs to create a transaction with the re-
ceiver’s public key and the amount, the user then signs and broadcasts the
transaction.
• The information about who has how much money is kept in a distributed fashion
on a set of servers.
.
However the protocol for B-money was never publicly published. This approach
was a good initial idea, however there were some flaws still to be fixed.
Bitcoin - Bitcoin was the first is a decentralized digital currency created by an un-
known person or group of people under the name Satoshi Nakamoto and released as
open-source software in 2009. It does not rely on a central server to process trans-
actions or store funds. There are a maximum of 2,099,999,997,690,000 Bitcoin ele-
ments (called Satoshis, the unit has been named in collective homage to the original
creator), which are currently most commonly measured in units of 100,000,000 known
as BTC. There will only ever be 21 million Bitcoin (BTC) to ever be created. - Bit-
coin Wiki=https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bitcoin
Blockchain or originally called "Block Chain", was invented in 2008 to serve as
the public distributed ledger for Bitcoin. The distributed ledger2 records and stores
transactions made between two entities in a verifiable and permanent way. A block
can’t be erased once it has been verified and has entered the blockchain. The list
of records are called blocks, in order to add a new block to the chain, miners3 have
to solve a difficult problem, and then verified by the rest, to successfully add a new
block to the chain.
The invention of the Blockchain for Bitcoin made it the first digital currency
to solve the double-spending problem without the need of a trusted authority or
central server. This invention served as a guidance for several other Blockchains or
cryptocurrencies that have appeared since then.
2A distributed ledger is a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized digital data geo-
graphically spread across multiple nodes. The primary advantage is the lack of central authority or
centralized data storage.
3(Miners are a individual or group of parties who compete to solve a difficult mathematical
problem first. Once the problem has been solved, the entity who solves it shares it with the rest
of miners to verify the validity of the solution. If the consensus agrees on the solution, the block
is then added to the Blockchain. This process repeats itself every 10 minutes approximately, where
all the miners compete to be the first to mine the block, as it will be the winner the one who will
receive the reward.)
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Figure 1.1. Blockchain Workflow - https://mn.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0
%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:Blockchain_workflow.png
One of the main innovations behind Bitcoin is the solution of all the issues that
came with the Double Spending process. The main points are the following:
• Details about the transaction are sent and forwarded to all or as many other
miners as possible.
• A constantly growing chain of blocks that contains a record of all transactions
is collectively maintained by all computers (each has a full copy).
• To be accepted in the chain, transaction blocks must be valid and must include
proof of work (one block generated by the network every 10 minutes).
• Blocks are chained in a way so that, if any is modified, all following blocks will
have to be recomputed.
When multiple valid continuations to this chain appear, only the longest branch
is accepted and it is then extended further, whilst the rest are discarded.
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Figure 1.2. Double Spending - https://www.reflectionsofthevoid.com/2015/11/
bitcoin-double-double-trouble.html
When Bob sees that his transaction has been included in a block, which has
been made part of the single longest and fastest-growing Blockchain (extended with
significant computational effort), he can be confident that the transaction by Alice
has been accepted by the computers in the network and is permanently recorded,
preventing Alice from creating a second transaction with the same coin.
Altcoins are the alternative cryptocurrencies launched after the success of Bit-
coin. Generally, these new projects tend to fix existing flaws found in Bitcoin, try
to optimize the procedure or the way it works, or in some cases give the technology
a spin introducing new concepts (such as Solidity, an object-oriented programming
language for writing smart contracts). The success of Bitcoin as the first peer-to-peer
digital currency has given place to many other cryptocurrencies that have appeared
in the past few years. Three of the most important altcoins identified which also work
under a different Blockchain technology are:
• Ethereum (Ethash) - Ethereum is a decentralized platform that runs smart
contracts. Smart contracts are elf-executing contracts where the terms of the
agreement between buyer and seller have been written into lines of code. This
enables developers to create markets, store registries of debts or promises, move
funds in accordance with instructions given long in the past (like a will or a
futures contract) and many other things that have not been invented yet, all
without a middleman or counterparty risk.
• Monero (Cryptonight) - Unlike many cryptocurrencies that are derivatives
of Bitcoin, Monero is based on the CryptoNight proof-of-work hash algorithm,
which comes from the CryptoNote protocol. It offers a higher level of security
and anonymity for users and their transactions. The Monero ledger, unlike
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Blockchain, doesn’t record the actual stealth addresses of parties to transac-
tions, and the one-time created address that is recorded is not linked to the
actual addresses of the parties as well.
All Monero transactions between two parties are mixed with other transactions
that occur among unrelated parties (obfuscation). Monero also handles trans-
actions by splitting the outgoing amounts into multiple parts and then treating
each split part as a separate transaction. This way in a single transaction,
there could be 5 senders parties and 7 receivers. The popularity of Monero is
not growing just because of attention from black market, but also because of
the large amount of people not fond of being watched by governments, hackers,
and corporations.
• Zcash (Equihash) - Zcash uses a special proof to secure the network called zk-
snark - or proof of construction. Unlike Bitcoin, where all the transactions are
public, Zcash maintains a secure ledger of balances without revealing parties
or amounts involved in transactions. This happens through the use of zero
knowledge proofs.
Wallets
BItcoin Core
Electroneum
etc etc
Vulnerabilities
• 51% attack - The "51% attack" can only be performed by an attacker, when
he has more computing power then the rest of the network. If this occurs, he
could be able to disconfirm others’ blocks confirming only their own, and thus
receive 100% of all new Bitcoins and block any transaction at their discretion.
(However they won’t be able to forward any transactions they want, because
he will not have others’ private keys to sign these transactions). Currently to
conduct such attack in the Bitcoin network would require computing power
many times more then the power of all TOP-500 rated supercomputers.
• Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) - Sending a large number of "junk " data
to the node that handles transactions may hinder its work. Bitcoin has built-in
protection against attacks such as "denial of service" but today this type of
attack becomes harder with each new attempt.
1.3.2 Anonymous Communications
TOR (The Onion Router) - is the most widely used anonymous communication
network available online. TOR enables server-side anonymity through the design of
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hidden services, also known as onion services. To achieve their anonymity goal, a
hidden service client and operator establish a communication tunnel, known as a
circuit, between each other over multiple intermediate routers.
Anonymity is maintained as long as the network relays are not controlled by an
adversary who can use de-anonymization techniques to try and discover TOR users.
Hidden services have also been subjected to active attacks in the wild. To ensure
transaction anonymity, Bitcoin has become the most popular payment method by
TOR hidden services. Unfortunately, this has contributed to the rise of illegal hidden
services, such as Silk Road, which offers illicit merchandises and services.
Figure 1.3. TOR structure - https://wikis.fdi.ucm.es/ELP/Archivo:Red_tor.png
Onion Routing - The TOR network utilizes Onion Routing as a way to anonymize
communications. The term “onion routing” comes from the layered encryption used,
resembling the layers of an onion. This allows Hidden Services to work as expected.
The messages sent between the sender and the receiver are transferred through
a path of nodes called a “chain” or a “circuit”. The nodes that form the chain are
determined after the sender communicates with the directory node, who assigns three
random nodes of the node pool. The message will travel hopping from node to node
until it arrives at its destination, in a way that forbids any node to know whether the
previous node is the sender or another node. Only the exit node knows its situation,
as it sends the message directly to the receiver.
The message is transmitted using asymmetric key cryptography. First, the onion
proxy communicates with the Onion Directory who indicates which will be the nodes
in the chain. Then, the sender communicates with the nodes to negotiate the cipher
key for each node. Once the sender knows each node encryption key, the Onion Proxy
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wraps the message in an IP package with the original end host IP as the destination
IP and the middle node as sender. This package is ciphered using the key negotiated
with the last Onion Relay. The Onion Proxy repeats the process using the middle
node (exit node as destination and entry node as origin) and lastly with the entry
node. Only the sender has the three keys so that it can encrypt the data he sends
in 3 layers. The final package has as many “layers” as Onion relays are involved
in the chain (3 by default). The originator sends the message encrypted with the
three layers of encryption to the entry node, who decrypts it with its key. The entry
node then sends the message (with two encryptions left) to the middle node, who
also decrypts the message and sends it to the exit node, who does the last decryption
stage and finally sends the message to the destination. With this chain, the originator
can communicate with the receiver anonymously. The chain can be used also from
the receiver to the sender.
Hidden Services - When visitors connect to the TOR network, TOR resolves those
.onion addresses and directs you to the anonymous service sitting behind that name.
Unlike with other services, hidden services provide two-way anonymity. The server
doesn’t know the IP of the client, like with any service you access over TOR, but the
client also doesn’t know the IP of the server. This provides extra privacy since it’s
being protected on both sides.
Silk Road 4 is the most notable and re-known example of a successful symbioses
of TOR Hidden Services and Bitcoin. Silk Road was an anonymous online market
available as a TOR Hidden Service and launched in February 2011. Silk road was
operated by a person under the pseudonym “Dread Pirate Roberts”5. In this market
place the operator charge a fee to each seller as a rent for using the platform, it acted
as a middle ware between both ends.
All operations were done through the SilkRoad escrow service: buyers’ bitcoins
were held by the SilkRoad until the order had been received. A mechanism was
introduced which allowed sellers to opt for the value of bitcoins held in escrow to
be fixed to their value in US$ at the time of the sale to mitigate against Bitcoin’s
volatility. Any changes in the price of bitcoins during transit were covered by Dread
Pirate Roberts.The only way to access Silkroad was through TOR Hidden Services
and buyers and sellers conducted all transactions with bitcoins.
4The name "Silk Road" comes from a historical network of trade routes started during the Han
Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) between Europe, India, China, and many other countries on the Afro-
Eurasian landmass.
5Silk Road was operated by the pseudonymous "Dread Pirate Roberts" (named after the fictional
character from The Princess Bride), who was known for espousing libertarian ideals and criticizing
regulation.
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Figure 1.4. Silk road payment system - https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road
After Silk Road was ceased by the FBI, several attempts of restoring the service
appeared, most of them being closed short after their opening [11].6
The Invisible Internet Project - I2P is an anonymous network, similar to TOR,
it is based on encryption layers but with the addition of a fourth layer. However, is
strictly message based, IP (TOR supports IP, FTP, HTTP/s and other protocols).
All communication is end to end encrypted, and even the end points ("destinations")
are cryptographic identifiers (Hidden Services).
1.3.3 Digital Forensic Analysis
Computer Forensics, or Digital Forensics , is a fairly new field. Digital foren-
sics includes the uncovering and describing the information contained on, or the state
6The latest version of the Silk Road (Silk Road 3.1) active today can be found under the following
Hidden Service: http://silkroad4n7fwsrw.onion/?road.
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or existence of, a digital artefact, this involves the preservation, acquisition, docu-
mentation, analysis, and interpretation of evidence from various storage media types.
Digital artefacts include computer systems, hard drives, CDs, and other storage de-
vices, as well as electronic documents and files like emails and JPEG images. The
fast-growing field of computer forensics includes several branches related to firewalls,
networks, databases, and mobile devices. Digital forensics technicians can find work
with many types of organizations: government, accounting firms, law firms, banks,
and software development companies. The most common is to support or refute a
hypothesis before criminal or civil courts. Essentially, any organization that has a
computer system may have a need for a digital forensics specialist.
Autopsy is one of the most widely used forensics tool, it is the graphical user
interface (GUI) used in The Sleuth Kit. It is very simple to operate and use, au-
tomating many of the procedures. It helps to identify, sort and catalogue relevant
pieces of forensic data in an ongoing investigation.
Some of the modules provide:
• Timeline Analysis - Advanced graphical event viewing interface.
• Hash Filtering - Flag known bad files and ignore known good.
• Keyword Search - Indexed keyword search to find files that mention relevant
terms.
• Web artefacts - Extract history, bookmarks, and cookies from Firefox, Chrome,
and IE.
• Data Carving - Recover deleted files from unallocated space.
• Multimedia - Extract EXIF from pictures and watch videos.
• Indicators of Compromise - Scan a computer using STIX.
When performing a digital forensic analysis, doing a binary copy is one of the
most important things to do during an investigation. It is required to get the in-
formation but without accessing to it, to do so, a copy of all the 0 and 1 that the
device contains has to be performed. To proof that the binary copy is identical to the
original artefact, a hash of both files has to be computed. Once this hash function
has been completed, in order to prove that the files have not been modified or altered,
both hashes should be checked to prove they are equal.
Recovering deleted files is an essential part of the forensics analysis. This is called
normally file carving. Once the binary copy is done, it can be used to recover files
that has been deleted from the studied device. There are different tools to perform
this part of the forensics analysis, one of the most used is the Linux tool “PhotoRec”.
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PhotoRec is an effective file recovery program, which enables you to recover various
file types, including multimedia, documents, archives and much more from a range of
hard storage devices (hard disks, CD-ROMs, USB, memory cards etc.).
One of the tools that is sometimes used by forensics are those that allow the
forensic engineer to get the timeline of the files in a specific directory. It consists
on the creation of a document which lists the names of all the files located inside a
certain directory and some useful information that can be used to filter the documents
trying to encounter evidences. This information may include: size, format of the file,
day of creation, day of the last modification, user that created the document and user
which did the last modification.
1.4 Outline
The thesis can be divided into two different parts. Part 1 is composed of chapter 2 ,
which is an explanation of how the Blockchain works, with specific detail in Bitcoin.
Also we will explain different attacks and de-anonymization techniques that can be
conducted in the Bitcoin P2P network, we will then proof that by doing a Man in
the Middle attack, a user can be identified in the network. Part 2 consists of chapter
3 and also gives a brief explanation of how TOR works. Different attacks and de-
anonymization techniques will be identified, and we will also proof how to protect
regular P2P network attacks by adding layers of encryption (Onion Routing). The
third part is composed by Chapter 4, where we will explain which information is
relevant and how to extract this information from a target’s PC. Which will then be
used to incriminate cybercriminals.
• In Chapter 2, We will also study and expose vulnerabilities and flaws that can
be found in the Bitcoin network. We will also study and expose vulnerabilities
and flaws that can be found in TOR’s hidden services and network. The main
objective is to try to discover the targets Bitcoin address and its IP address.
We will also propose some requirements to perform the attacks identified.
• In Chapter 3, we give more insight in how to proceed with a Forensic investi-
gation in a Bitcoin related scenario, once the user has been identified. We will
assume the file is encrypted, and therefore, we will have to decrypt this file.
This chapter will be a Proof of concept of the previous points, where we will
extract the relevant information in the targets PC to perform a forensics study.
• 4 In Chapter 4, we will present the conclusions of the study as well as point out
further study trends, where the paper could be developed.
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1.5 Ethical Considerations
The different attacks explained to de-anonymize Bitcoin clients described in this
Project are proposed in order to be carried out on live systems and explained as
such, and are meant to successfully de-anonymize clients on real live systems. Con-
sequently, this attacks are explained as if they were performed in such environments.
In the case of the attacks described to successfully de-anonymize users in real
networks, those were only a theoretical proposition and therefore were never taken
into practice. It was never part of the main scope of the project.
The proof-of-concept experiment carried out is intended to fully de-anonymize a
real client. For ethical reasons no user outside our control was targeted or victim in
any way, the experiments were targeted to myself.
All the wallets that were used to test the Forensic tool were of my own, and the
brainwallet Bitcoin addresses created were double checked in order to reassure that
they did not have a rightful owner or funds in them.
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Chapter 2
DE-ANONYMIZATION OF USERS
The first part in the investigation will be to try and identify the criminal. As we know
two possible networks where we could get a glimpse of the targets IP address, we will
identify different attacks that may help us achieve this goal. Bitcoin network has a
typical P2P structure, some of the attacks performed in a P2P network can be per-
formed here too. TOR network is also based in a decentralized P2P network, however,
the layer routing mechanism will require new methods to attack it successfully.
2.1 De-anonymization of clients in Bitcoin Network
Anonymity in the Bitcoin system is based on the following facts:
• Bitcoin address cannot be mapped to the real identity.
• Bitcoin transactions don’t contain any personal information.
• The new transactions are spread radially, thus the sender’s IP address will not
be exposed.
However, Bitcoin is not fully anonymous. We can find more than one weakness
that can help both criminals or special forces agents identify real users behind Bitcoin
addresses.[14]
• The real-name authentication mechanism (exchange houses are the most com-
mon platform) helps Bitcoin service providers to find the addresses that ever
deposited and withdrew.
• Bitcoin address exposed on the internet can be related to its owner (forums
were people post their Bitcoin addresses to receive donations).
• The chain of transactions is transparent and traceable
(https://www.blockchain.com/explorer).
• Gathering some or all inputs when sending Bitcoins to others, which may expose
other addresses of the sender (Clusters or transaction graphs).
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2.1.1 Tracing transactions history
Tracing the history of transactions can be used to identify the address. It should be
remembered that Bitcoin is not completely anonymous means of payment. This is a
very generalist theory, as we will see that by using advanced software we can develop
tools able to perform this to a high degree of detail.
2.1.2 Sybil attack
The Sybil attack is an attack where the reputation system is corrupted or sabotaged
by forging identities in P2P networks. The attacker will try to fill the network with
nodes under his control, then, any new user that tries to connect to the Bitcoin
network will connect to ones owned by the attacker. If this situation was to happen,
other users will only be able to connect to an alternate network where newly created
blocks will specifically by used for fraud or other illegal purposes. How can this
happen:
• The attacker blocks transactions from other users, disconnecting you from the
public network.
• The attacker only connects you to the blocks he created in a separate network.
• The attacker can see all of your transactions through the use of special programs.
By the nature of this attack, in order to perform it successfully, the amount of
resources required is limited to very few. Therefore it can be estimated that govern-
ments or very large organizations are the only capable of performing this attacks. If
any attacker was to perform a successful attack on the network, it would have the
possibility to identify the IP address of every targeted node in the network, which
may lead to the de-anonimzation of the addresses of Bitcoin users1.
2.1.3 Through clusters and transaction graphs
The main idea of clusters and transaction graphs is to link addresses to a specific
user. Even though anonymity is still present, it increases the amount of possible
addresses for each different address found for a specific user. Thus, if a Bitcoin
address happened to be de-anonymized, it could be checked with the cluster database
for fast correlation. This is a very powerful tool proposed by Meiklejohn [1], in which
users can be associated to one or more addresses by means of two heuristic models.
1By identifying and excluding Bitcoin nodes that belong to exchange, online wallet and other
online websites where more than one address may use that Bitcoin network node, the attacker can
then isolate nodes that belong to private users.
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1st Heuristic model [10]: When a Bitcoin user receives or spend funds, the wallet
uses or creates new addresses for each transaction. Remaining funds are kept in those
addresses, therefore, if we see a transaction spends coins originating from multiple
inputs, we can assume that the transaction was executed by one user. With this, we
can assume that the user owns all the addresses related to the transaction inputs, as
the transaction had to be signed using the private keys that matches all the public
keys of all inputs.
E.g. If Alice sends money to Bob through addresses A and C, and later sends
money to Charlie through addresses C and D, we can cluster addresses A, C and D
under Alice’s pseudonym.
2nd Heuristic model: Whenever a transaction has a single output, the output address
is usually controlled by the same entity that owns the input address. The reasoning
here is that the likelihood of a user owning the exact amount of bitcoins in a single
UTXO2 that wants to send to another address is extremely low. Typically when a
transaction is made, a change address is created to return the remaining bitcoins to
the sender. It is extremely hard to identify change addresses with high certainty, but
if there is no change address we can suppose that the money is just being transferred
between addresses owned the same user (or distinct UTXOs are being consolidated
into a single larger UTXO).
2An unspent transaction output (UTXO) is an output of a blockchain transaction that has not
been spent, generally used as an input in a new transaction.
30
Figure 2.1. Transition graph or cluster address grouping
2.1.4 Through coin-mixing services
A cryptocurrency tumbler (commonly known as coin-mixer) is a service used to ob-
fuscate funds in their current address by sending them to a new address. This process
is achieved by the use of an intermediate entity, who mixes cryptocurrencies funds
with others, from other users, so it is harder to trace them back to the initial user.
E.g. (For simplicity, each user only has one input) If Alice, Bob and Charlie (with
respective addresses A, B and C) send their desired amount of Bitcoins that they want
to obfuscate, to T (tumbler, address T). The Tumbler then sends the input amounts
minus a transaction fee (kept by the tumbler as profit) to an account or accounts
specified by the users, as outputs. Alice will then receive Bitcoins to addresses E and
F, Bob will receive to address G and Charlie will receive to addresses H and I. Hence,
the larger the amount of inputs and outputs involved in this process, the harder it is
to trace coin-mixing service users.
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Figure 2.2. Bitcoin-mixing
We can try to isolate users mathematically, by calculating the mutual information
of outgoing and incoming transactions. Let X be the discrete random variable with
probability mass function Pi = Pr(X = i), where i represents each possible value that
X may take. In this case, each i corresponds to an element of the anonymity set (a
sender). We denote by H(X) the entropy of the system after the attack has taken
place. For each sender belonging to the senders set of size N, the attacker assigns a
probability pi . H(X) can be calculated as:
H(X) = −XN i = 1 Pi ∗ log2(Pi)
Let HM be the maximum entropy of the system we want to measure, for the
actual size of the anonymity set: HM = log2 (N) , where N is the number of honest
senders (size of the anonymity set). The information learned by the attacker with
that specific attack can be expressed as HM - H(X). We divide by HM to normalize
the value. We then define the anonymous mutual information provided by the system
as:
I = 1−HM −H(X)HM = H(X)HM
2.2 De-anonymization of clients in TOR Network
It is important to highlight that TOR is not the main point of study of this project,
therefore it will only be explained from a theoretical point of view. Although it is not
the focus, some basis will be left for future studies, in case this project wants to be
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expanded from this perspective.
There is a large set of precautionary measures and best practices to make web
browsing safer and more secure for users. Let’s say that, for example, we send an
HTTPs request to a server and someone intercepts that request. That person can
not know what that message says, since it has been encrypted. We will assume that
the level of security it is still not enough and want to take this to the next level, i.e.
you don’t even want anyone sniffing on your network, to know which server we are
contacting to and if we are making any requests or not. This is where The Onion
Router comes into play.
TOR Network has proven to successfully obfuscate its users real identity by
adding extra layers of security. However, like most of things, it has been proven
that it’s not perfect, and that users can still be de-anonymized. Here we will present
some of the most best known techniques or attacks that can be carried out in the
TOR network, in order to exploit its vulnerabilities. Most of this attacks require the
control of a large portion of its relays, which makes this kind of attacks improbable
or unfeasible to perform (due to the high amount of resources required, unobtainable
to many organizations).
By increasing the routing layers in the intermediate relays, some of the following
attacks could be avoided (As I2P has implemented in its application). However this
will have repercussions in the total communication delay between the user and the
end point.
According to existing de-anonymizing techniques on the TOR network, we can
sort these techniques into two groups from two different perspectives
• Passive and active attacks - The adversary can passively observe the net-
work’s traffic or actively manipulate traffic.
• Single-end and end-to-end attacks - The attacker can impose the network’s
anonymity by monitoring or controlling TOR circuits at either the enter relay
or exit relay side, or at both edges of the circuit.
Based on their method and goal, attacks can be categorized into seven groups:
• Correlation Attacks (End-to-end, Passive Attack)
• Timing Attacks (End-to-end, Active Attack)
• Supportive Attacks (Not classified)
• FBI NIT exploit (Not classified)
• Differential Attack (Single-end, Passive Attack)
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2.2.1 Correlation Attacks
Correlation attacks are well-known de-anonymization attacks. In this category of
attacks, it is assumed that the attacker controls both the entry node and the exit
node of the circuit. Traffic correlation attacks can be easily done by eavesdropping
the outgoing and incoming traffic between the victim client and the first relay node
(entry guard), as well as traffic reaching the final destination (hidden service, exit
relay node. etc). Once the traffic is being monitored, statistical analysis is used to
determine that they belong to the same circuit.
As such, TOR does not promote absolute anonymity. The user’s address as well
as the destination address of the monitored traffic are obtained by the attacker, who
can successfully de-anonymize the target via correlation attacks. Although the at-
tacker doesn’t necessarily need to take control of either the guard and exit relays, it
just needs to be able to operate the traffic running through those two nodes. For this
attack, we assume that the attacker controls one or more very fast exit routers which
see a significant fraction of the traffic exiting the TOR network, thus it gets access to
pseudonyms of the users (ex. cookies, logins).
“The way we generally explain it is that TOR tries to protect against traffic analy-
sis, where an attacker tries to learn whom to investigate, but TOR can’t protect against
traffic confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries
to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then
doing the math. And the math is really effective. There are simple packet count-
ing attacks (Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems) and
moving window averages (Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems), but
the more recent stuff is downright scary, like Steven Murdoch’s PET 2007 paper about
achieving high confidence in a correlation attack despite seeing only 1 in 2000 packets
on each side (Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries).” [13]
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Figure 2.3. Traffic & Timing Correlation Attack -
https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/30202/hacking/tor-traffic-analysis-attack.html
At the time (early 2014), TOR relays could easily confirm their suspicion by
adding an arbitrary value to the packet and check for it on the other end to reach
the level of certainty. This was quickly patched, but correlation attack is still not
prevented.
2.2.2 Timing Attacks
Timing attacks are another form of de-anonymizing attacks. During a timing attack
an adversary manipulates both the entry and the exit relay of a targeted client. By
correlating flow patterns in traffic flowing from the entry node to traffic flowing to
the exit node, the adversary can determine which server a client is communicating
with.
The aim of the attack is to uncover the autonomous system (AS) which contain
the target and possibly also the identity of the target. The target can be either an
OP, an OR or a hidden service.
The attack is composed of three steps.
• First, a server is needed that is colluding with the adversary. This server may
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be controlled by the adversary (which will make the attack easier to execute),
but this is not strictly necessary.
• Second, several network bandwidth probing nodes are required.
• Third, maps containing ingress and egress routers of AS’s are needed. 3
The adversary places the bandwidth probing nodes close to ingress and egress
routers at the boundary of the AS’s. The most useful location for the probing nodes
is determined using the acquired network maps.
The adversary must then get the target client to connect to the colluding server.
Once the connection is established, the server will vary the bandwidth of the connec-
tion to the client, leaving a distinct pattern along the path of the connection. This is
the pattern that will trace back to the OP of the client.
The bandwidth probing nodes at the AS boundaries will probe ingress and egress
routers in order to find the bandwidth pattern used by the colluding server. If the
pattern is detected on a router, the corresponding AS is probably part of the path
from client to server. Using this technique, the adversary can trace the route back to
the client.
2.2.3 Supportive Attacks
This attacks do not directly aim to de-anonymize TOR users or disrupt the TOR
network but rather are helpful to perform a de-anonymization attack or a disruptive
attack at a later point in time.
In the Sybil attack, an adversary must control a major amount of virtual iden-
tities (relays) in the network in order to obtain a large influence in the network.
The effectiveness of many attacks on TOR depends on the consensus weight of the
attacker, which is the amount of traffic an attacker can observe. As the consensus
weight grows, a number of other TOR attacks become easier to execute. Examples of
attacks that are easier in combination with a Sybil attack are the fingerprinting and
correlation attacks.
Besides simplifying other attacks, the Sybil attack poses a major risk on the usage
of the TOR network and therefore on the anonymity of its users. The effectiveness
of TOR depends on the reliability given to the TOR relays. Less users means a
decrease in the overall anonymity of the network. The remaining users will continue
using the network with a lower anonymity, presenting better opportunities for attacks.
This problem can be exploited by adding malicious relays and strategically affecting
the reliability of anonymous communications to increase the odds of an adversary
compromising user anonymity.
3Ingress traffic is traffic in the TOR network that originates outside of it. Egress traffic originates
inside the TOR network and is sent outside the network.
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However, since Sybil relays typically behave and appear similarly, there are some
heuristics that can be used to detect a Sybil attack to some extends. Relays that
are part of a Sybil attack often join and leave the network simultaneously, they
have common configuration parameters, and may frequently change their identity
fingerprint to manipulate TOR’s distributed hash table.
2.2.4 FBI NIT exploit
The NIT (Network Investigative Technique) is a form of malware employed by the
FBI since at least 2002. It is a drive-by script (written in JS) which is downloaded by
the target (or more than one target) computer. The malware is sent via TOR using
Javascrit features, consisting of three components:
• The exploit sent over the TOR browser and network.
• The payload sends back to the attacker personal information regarding the
targets IP direction and configuration.
• The server that support the infrastructure which hosts the NIT exploit but
modifies each copy sent to include a unique identifier. This way it can be used
to mass identify users in the network.
2.2.5 Differential Attack
Consider a user which periodically checks some Web server or a web service that
instructs the user’s browser to periodically re-establish streams or any web sites with
auto-refresh contents. The aim of the attacker is to find at least one of the guard
nodes of a pseudonymous user (identified by a cookie or a login credential) that uses
such a service for several days. Note that this attack does not require a single long-
lived circuit or session. It just requires that a TOR client is connected to the TOR
network for non-negligible amount of time within the span of a month (as long as the
guards are still valid).[3]
In this attack, the attacker has control over a significant number of exit relays in
the TOR network. The reason behind only controlling exit nodes is that these relays
are the ones that can sniff traffic between the server and the sender. Assuming that
a user visits a Web server that causes recurrent connections to occur. One of the
specifications in TOR, is that connections last 10 minutes, therefore after this time,
the browser creates a new one for the user. Ten minutes after the first connection, the
users TOR client will have to build a new circuit. Given a sufficient number of exit
nodes controlled by the attacker, the attacker can determine the type of user behind
each connection.
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2.3 De-anonymization requirements
Due to a lack of time and resources, none of the attacks explained above were able to
be performed to proof them. As explained, in most of the attacks, for the attacker to
successfully de-anonymize a user, he must control a significant amount of the network
nodes. We will calculate the minimum requirements a user or organization should
require in order to try and achieve a positive attack.
For both networks, we will consider that being in control of at least 10% of the
network’s nodes, will be enough to identify the targeted user.
Regarding Bitcoin P2P network, according to https://bitcoinist.com/bitcoin
-nodes-10k-reachable/ the amount of bitcoin nodes in the network is 64768. Therefore,
we would require to control at least 6477 Bitcoin nodes.
On the other hand, according to https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#
aggregate/all the amount of reachable TOR relays in the network is 6628. If we
were to perform the attack in the TOR network, we would require to control 663
relays.
2.3.1 Budget requirement
As mentioned before, the set up we would build up, would try and require the min-
imum specifications. For it, we have decided to propose two possible combinations.
The first one would be to use Raspberry Pi’s Model B, while the second one would
require a Desktop PC. The only specification that has been taken into consideration
is the Hard Drive space. The actual Bitcoin Blockchain occupies around 250GB, so
we require a 500GB or above microSD for the Raspberry and at least a 500GB HDD
for the desktop PC.
The following table has calculated the required budget to build both set ups:
BUDGET Raspberry Pi price PC price
BITCOIN NODES 10% e 66,00 e 302,48
64768 6477 e 427.468,80 e 1.959.102,46
Raspberry Pi price PC price
TOR RELAYS 10% e 66,00 e 302,48
6628 663 e 43.758,00 e 200.544,24
Table 2.1. Budget for a 10% network control.
We have disregarded any concern for the RAM memory necessary to run any
desired script or application that may analyze the network (such as Wireshark).
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2.3.2 Time requirement
We will use KALI LINUX as the preferred OS for all the machines, both Raspberrys
and PCs. The average time required to install KALI in a machine is around 30
minutes.
As said before, the actual size of the Bitcoin Blockchain is around 250GB. Assum-
ing a download speed of 10MB/s, the time required to fully download the Blockchain
in a machine would take be 7 hours (in a normal case scenario (such as the set up used
for the proof of concept), the download speed varies and the total time required drops
to 9 hours). To optimize the installation time, whilst one machine is downloading the
blockchain, KALI will be installed in the other machines, such as in an assembly line.
Therefore, the required time to fully complete the set up installation will be the
following:
Bitcoin : 0, 5h+ (7 ∗ 6477)h = 45338, 5h
This means that a single user would spend 1890 days, without stopping, to com-
plete the configuration process (A unique internet connection to download all the
Blockchains). We can not download multiple Blockchains simultaneously as this will
affect the overall download speed.
For the TOR de-anonymization attack, the time required is considerably shorter.
The average time required to configure a TOR relay in a Raspberry Pi, once the OS
has been installed, takes around 45 minutes. According to TOR requirements, a
relays must be active for 72 hours before it comes online and accessible by users. To
optimize the installation time, whilst one machine is in the 3 day acceptance period,
other machines will be configured.
Therefore, the total time required for this set up will be the following:
TOR : (1, 25 ∗ 663)h+ 72h = 900, 75h
This means that a single user would spend 38 days, without stopping, to com-
plete the configuration process.
A very important part that has not been calculated is the human power required.
A single person cannot monitor all the incoming and outgoing traffic through all the
nodes unless it has a very good script configured, that analyzes the network waiting
for a coincidence to appear.
We have also disregarded the electricity consumption required to power up all
the nodes 24/7, as well as the maintenance needed to keep all the nodes up and active
or the internet connection required.
This process can also be done by other simple network attacks, however most of
them require very specific situations. Probably the most effective attack would be a
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Man In The Middle. In an eavesdropping attack, the attacker would secretly relay
the connection between the target and the network node. The attacker would decide
to monitor the communication in search for any particular piece of information, or
alter it. In this particular case, an attacker could link a Bitcoin user to a specific
Bitcoin address, or he could alter the information in the message to send the Satoshis
to a different address.
In a real case scenario, this attack would imply that the attacker might already
have some kind of knowledge of who the criminal might be, as the Man In The Middle
attack requires both entities to exist in the same network simultaneously.
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Chapter 3
BITCOIN FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Due to the time and economic requirements calculated to identify a user in both the
Bitcoin and TOR network, we will suppose a theoretical scenario where we do control
such set up. In this scenario where we control 952 Bitcoin nodes, we have decided to
perform a sybil attack. We have been monitoring the network until we detected that
the criminals Bitcoin address (the criminals Bitcoin address that was seen buying guns
in the Black Market is the following: 34ZUdU5mWqT4frvQC9YMebNhrS8iVYg2Xo)
has connected to one of our nodes. We will make him download in the background
a script that will send us its IP address (similar to the NIT exploit attack in TOR
network).
We found out that the address 34ZUdU5mWqT4frvQC9YMebNhrS8iVYg2Xo
was linked to the following IP address: 2.152.6X.XXX. The job now is to investigate
if the Bitcoin address that we intercepted, corresponds to one of the addresses the
target has under his possession. We have joined with a Security organization to enter
the targets house and obtain any possible evidence that can incriminate him (link the
user to the Bitcoin address intercepted).
In order to be able to present valid evidences or proofs before criminal or civil
courts, it is important to take into consideration the processes involved in Digital
Forensics.
3.1 Forensic Procedures
3.1.1 Investigation Initiation
For businesses of any size, it is important for the business to secure the data for foren-
sic analysis. Prior to a new forensic investigation, it’s crucial that the company keeps
unaltered all the possible files or systems that may be relevant for the investigation.
This way, all the evidences will give a clearer image of "who and what" was involved
in the crime.
The most effective methods to ensure legal admissibility while preparing to en-
gage a forensic analyst, which will be carried out in this lab, include the following:
• Drive Imaging
• Hash Values
• Data Recovery
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• Computer system history
• Chain of Custody
3.1.2 Drive Imaging
Before investigators can begin analyzing the evidence rescued from a crime scene,
it needs to imaged first. Imaging a drive is a forensic process in which an analyst
creates a bit-by-bit duplicate1 of a drive. This forensic image of all digital media
helps retain evidence for the investigation. When analyzing the image, it should be
kept in mind that even formatted drives can preserve important recoverable data. In
the best cases, file carving techniques can recover all the deleted files.
As a rule, investigators should exclusively operate on the forensic image created
and never perform forensic analysis on the original media. In fact, once a system has
been compromised, it is advisable to do nothing with the system other than isolating
it to prevent any incoming or outgoing connections. Limiting actions on the original
computer is important, especially if evidence needs to be taken to court. Once finished
the evidence manipulation, the forensic investigators should be able to prove that the
information handled has not been tampered in any way by presenting cryptographic
hash values, digital time stamps or legal procedures followed.
By utilizing the bit-stream image, the Computer Forensics Examiner takes no
risk of contaminating the original evidence. It creates a bit-stream image by attaching
the original computer media to a write protection device that ensures no writes can
take place to the original media while the bit-stream image is created.
3.1.3 Hash Values
When an investigator images a machine for analysis, the process generates crypto-
graphic hash values (In this case, the files will be hashed with MD5). The purpose
of a hash value is to verify the authenticity and integrity of the image as an exact
duplicate of the original media.
Hash values are crucial, especially when presenting evidence into court. If the
information extracted was to be altered even by the smallest bit of data, the checksum
would generate a completely new hash value. When a new file is created or an
existing file on the computer is edited, it generates a new hash value for that file.
After the evidence study has finished, and all the relevant data has been extracted
and manipulated, a hash of the image is computed. If the output hash values do
not match the expected values, the court may induce that the evidence has been
tampered, and therefore the results may have been manipulated.
1Bit-by-Bit duplicate (also referred to as mirror image backup) involves the backup of all areas of
a computer hard disk drive or another type of storage media (all the metadata is extracted from the
target media as it is important to be able to recuperated deleted files). Such backup replicates with
exactitude all sectors on a given storage device. Therefore, all files and ambient data are copied.
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Figure 3.1. Bit-by-Bit copy
3.1.4 Data recovery (File/Data Carving)
File carving is a process used to recover files metadata or ambient data that are
stored in a drive or other data storage device. This method tries to recover files
without knowing or having accessible its metadata. It is important to notice that the
software used to perform the file carving process, is executed in read-only access to
avoid writing over the drive. This way, you can ensure that the image is not being
altered. For a safer process, it is advisable to perform this technique in the forensic
image created earlier in an investigation.
File carving techniques are most commonly used to recover files from from the
unallocated2 space in a drive. Many file systems do not zero-out the data when they
delete files. Therefore, file carving techniques exploit this to analyze the file structure
and content of the raw bytes found in the drive. File carving is the process of recon-
2Unallocated space refers to the area of the drive which no longer holds any file information,
however it potentially contains complete and partial files that can remain untouched for long periods
of time. The residual data cannot be viewed by an ordinary computer user, but can be discovered
and extracted.
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structing files by scanning the raw bytes of the disk and reassembling them. This is
usually done by examining the header and footer of a file.
3.1.5 Computer system history
When investigating a crime, it is critical to have an idea of when applications or files
were executed. Extracting information from the drives metadata or log files, we can
create a timeline of the usage of the drive. This output can help analyze documents
preserved from computers, servers, or other executable files existent in the memory
image by comparing the date and time they were last accessed or created. This can
help correlate any suspicious activity in the drive or system.
In cyberattacks were there has been a breach in a system, it is crucial in the
investigation to quickly scan relevant information. Creating a timeline analysis can
help identify relevant activity faster.
Timelines are useful to analyze the picture of how a computer was used. By
looking at the high-level activity for the past month, it may be able to identify what
directories had activity. This helps to determine what user accounts and applications
are used. Timelines are also useful to analyze all of the places that had activity in
a given time range when intrusion activity occurred (assuming that the file system
time stamps were not modified by the attacker) and identify all of the places that the
intruder placed files.
3.1.6 Chain of Custody
The chain of custody collects all the relevant information occurred during an inves-
tigation. From the media collection, its transfer or its manipulation by the forensic
analyst, all the actions regarding all the media found or obtained, this artefact should
document all this movements and capture signatures and dates upon media handoff.
Once we have created a binary copy of the media, this artefact demonstrates that the
image has been under known possession since the time it was created.
Any misalignment or gap during the possession of a record (or media), any situ-
ation where the evidence has been in an unsecured location or the loss of an evidence
can be problematic (in the case of a loss, this can be disastrous for the investigation).
Any lapse in chain of custody nullifies its legal value, and thus the analysis. Investi-
gators may still analyze the information but the results are not likely to hold up in
court.
In order to protect the chain of custody and make it as authentic as possible, a
series of steps must be taken into consideration during the forensic analysis process.
The following established procedure should be followed according to the chain of
custody for electronic evidence:
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• Save original material: Work always on copies of the digital evidence, by creating
a Bit-by-Bit clone of it. This way we create a complete duplicate of the evidence
and ensure that the original evidence is preserved and kept unmodified.
• Photos of physical evidence: Photos of physical evidence establish the chain of
custody and make it more authentic.
• Take screenshots of digital evidence content: Taking screenshots is an effective
way of establishing the chain of custody.
• Document date, time, and any other information of receipt. Recording the
timestamps of who has had the evidence allows investigators to build a reliable
timeline of where the evidence was prior to being obtained. In the event that
there is a hole in the timeline, further investigation may be necessary.
• Perform a hash test analysis. Performing a hash test ensures that the data we
obtain from the previous bit-by-bit copy procedure is not corrupt and reflects
that the original evidence has not been tampered.
3.2 Tools
• BitcoinCore wallet.3
• TFM Alvaro Forensic Tool (FIGURE 3.2)
– MD5 checksum + Bit-to-bit copy.
– File Carving.
– Timeline.
– Extract wallet private key.
– Password Crack.
– MD5 Checksum.
• 2 computers with KALI distribution.
• 8GB Toshiba thumb drive. (EVIDENCE A.7)
• 500GB Hard Disk Drive. (EVIDENCE ??
• 1TB Hard Disk Drive.
• AMD CPU FX-8350.
3Bitcoin Core is free and open-source software that serves as a bitcoin node and provides a bitcoin
wallet which fully verifies payments. It is considered to be bitcoin’s reference implementation and
is the most used implementation by a large margin.
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Figure 3.2. TFM Tool
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3.3 Lab Setup
Remember that during the de-anonymization process, we identified that this address
addr=34ZUdU5mWqT4frvQC9YMebNhrS8iVYg2Xo was linked to the following IP
address: 2.152.6X.XXX.
Assuming the user works on a Linux distribution, more exactly KALI, we will
set up the bitcoin folder where all the relevant data files can be found. The software
used to create the Bitcoin wallet will be Bitcoin Core (thick wallet) version 0.17.0.1.
In this case we have created the directory inside the Documents folder: /home/hallvardr/Documents/bitcoin-
0.17.1/.
Once we open the folder we can find the following files inside the bitcoin folder:
Figure 3.3. Bitcoin Folder
• banlist.dat
• bitcoind.pid
• chainstate
• blocks - Stores Bitcoin blocks, in network format, dumped to disk raw. They
are only needed for re-scanning missing transactions in a wallet, reorganizing
to a different part of the chain, and serving the block data to other nodes that
are synchronizing.
• fee_estimates.dat - Statistics used to estimate fees and priorities. Saved just
before program shutdown, and read in at startup.
• peers.dat - Storage for peer information to make a reconnect easier. This file
uses a bitcoin-specific file format, unrelated to any database system.
• wallet.dat
• debug.log - Bitcoin’s verbose log file. Automatically trimmed from time to time.
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• mempool.dat
• wallets
Our focus in this exercise will be on the wallet.dat, found in /wallets, since this
is the file that contains all the private key information stored from the clients Bitcoin
wallet. It includes all of the information needed to access a Bitcoin wallet and its
associated funds. It is important to notice there might will be other .dat files, as
these can be manual backups created by the user.
Figure 3.4. Wallets
The information that can be found in the wallet.dat file is the following:
• Keypairs for each of your addresses
• Transactions done from/to your addresses
• User preferences
• Default key
• Reserve keys
• Accounts
• Version number
• Key pool
All this information can be identified in FIGURE 3.6. As the wallet is new, the
addresses have not performed any actions, the transaction done field will not appear
or appear as empty. Therefore this field will not be identifiable.
There are four classes of keys:
• Used keys, which have unredeemed transaction outputs linked to them (and
thus contain funds).
48
• Used keys, which only have redeemed transaction outputs linked to them (wort-
hless, but the addresses may be used still by others).
• Unused keys (whose corresponding addresses may have been published).
• Reserve keys (whose corresponding addresses have typically never been di-
vulged, but may have been divulged at the time the export is imported again).
A Bitcoin wallet works with asymmetric or public-key cryptography, which gen-
erates the public-key-and-private-key pair required for users to create transactions
between them. In this case to transfer Bitcoins between them and register the infor-
mation related to the transaction in the Blockchain. Both public and private keys,
are large integer numbers represented using a separate Wallet Import Format (WIF)4
consisting of letters and numbers. In theory, each public key should only be used
once to preserve the anonymity, as we know that addresses can be used to track down
users. While the address is public, the private key should be kept secret to avoid
money theft and identity usurpation.
If we do a dump of the wallet.dat file, we can observe the fields identified before:
$ b i t co in−c l i dumpwallet /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/TFM/
r e s u l t s /dump . txt
Figure 3.5. bitcoin-cli dumpwallet
4Wallet Import Format (WIF, also known as Wallet Export Format) is a way of encoding a
private ECDSA key so as to make it easier to copy. The procedure for this encoding can be found
in:Appendix B
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Figure 3.6. bitcoin-cli dumpwallet
We can identify all the fields indicated before.
For the complexity of the exercise we will also assume that the wallet.dat file has
been encrypted by the user. The wallet.dat file will be encrypted using the following
command:
$ b i t co in−c l i enc ryptwa l l e t popatop
Figure 3.7. bitcoin-cli encryptwallet
Where popatop will be the password with which we will encrypt the wallet.dat
file.
Wallet encryption uses AES-256-CBC to encrypt the private keys that are held
in a wallet. The keys are encrypted with a master key which is entirely random.
This master key is then encrypted with AES-256-CBC with a key derived from the
passphrase using SHA-512. Although the underlying code supports multiple encrypted
copies of the same master key (and thus multiple passphrases) the client does not
yet have a method to add additional passphrases. Therefore once discovered the wal-
let’s passphrase, it will be valid for all the possible master keys. - Bitcoin Wiki -
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Wallet_encryption
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If we try to open the file again, we will see the wallet.dat file is now encrypted
and therefore we can not access it without prior decryption.
Figure 3.8. bitcoin-cli decryptwallet
At runtime, the client loads the wallet as it normally would, however the keystore
stores the keys in encrypted form. When the passphrase is required, it must first be
entered with the walletpassphrase RPC command. This will change the wallet to
"unlocked" state where the unencrypted master key is stored in memory.
This "unlock" state will temporarily decrypt the wallet, the time the wallet will
be accessible is determined by the value set in the RPC command (In this case, this
value will be set to 120 seconds). Once the password has been validated, we will
perform the same action as before to dump the wallet file.
$ b i t co in−c l i wa l l e tpa s sphra s e popatop 120
$ b i t co in−c l i dumpwallet /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/TFM/
r e s u l t s /wallet_dump . txt
Figure 3.9. bitcoin-cli dumpwallet encrypted
After unlocking the wallet, we will be able to dump the information contained
in it again (FIGURE 3.10). This will prove the validity of the password, and will
also allow us to investigate the wallet. Investigating the wallet will be the last part
of the proof-of-concept, since it contains the information needed to prove a criminal
guilty before a court.
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Figure 3.10. bitcoin-cli dumpwallet
3.4 Proof of Concept, Accessing a Bitcoin folder
3.4.1 Thumb Drive Study
By this point the criminal has now been identified and we have gained access to its
computer and personal devices. To create the most real case scenario possible, we
will follow steps that should be taken in a Forensic Analysis scenario. In order to
achieve this, we will have to preserve the Chain of custody and integrity of the files.
We have reached the targets home. We have spotted a large amount of pen drives
inside a plastic bag (EVIDENCE A.1) in one of the cupboards (Evidences A.2
and A.6). In order to preserve the Integrity of the data, we have created a binary
copy of each of them. Analyzing the images of the thumb drives we have found that
one of them (Evidence A.7) seems to contain two files that might be related to
Bitcoin wallets (FIGURE 3.11). By the name we think that the files are backups
from a Bitcoin wallet.
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Figure 3.11. Pen Drive data files
We will work with this pen drive. First of all, in order to create a binary copy
of it, we must look up the name of the drive the thumb drive is connected to.
$ sudo f d i s k − l
Figure 3.12. Identify Pen drive’s mount point
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Since we have the pen drive’s drive location (FIGURE 3.12), we will start the
tool created for this laboratory.
$ python TFM_Alvaro . py
The first option will create a binary copy of the pen drive. This will make a
bit-for-bit duplicate of the pen drive in the folder where we will keep all of the results
(TFM/results). This image will be the core of the task, since it is the main element
of study. We will have to select the input file or drive and select the output where we
would like to save the copy of the image. Once the binary copy has been completed
successfully, the script will automatically compute the checksum of the file. This
checksum which is a MD5 hash of the .dd image, will be necessary to compare it with
a checksum done at the end of the study to prove the data inside the image has not
been altered.
Figure 3.13. Create Pen Drive’s binary copy and compute the Checksum
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The input file will be /dev/sdf and the output file will be: /media/hallvardr/
_backup/TFM/results. The image will be called copy_image.dd (FIGURE 3.13).
The output of the checksum function will be a file called: hashoriginal.txt. The
hash can be found in FIGURE 3.14.
Figure 3.14. Initial Image hash
As said before, this hash is crucial for the investigation and must be kept unal-
tered.
Once the binary copy has been made, the next step will be to recover files from the
pen drive. Even though with the two files that have been found, a good study could be
performed, the user might have saved the wallet passwords in a text document which
would facilitate the investigation. Therefore, we will carve the image copy_image.dd
to restore any deleted files. (Due to the size of the file, it wasn’t possible to upload
them to the Github repository)
The input file will be /media/hallvardr/_backup/TFM/results
copy_image.dd and the output file will be: /media/hallvardr/_backup/TFM/
results/recovery/recovery (FIGURE 3.15).
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Figure 3.15. File carving
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Figure 3.16. Pen Drive files recovery
Once the File carving process has finished, we can take a look at all the recovered
files. (FIGURE 3.17). The recovery procedure has created 7 folders with recovered
files from the historical movement of files that have taken place in the removable
storage media found in the users home.
In cases like this, it is recommendable to use use other programs that help identify
files. Some of this tools are OCR and eDiscovery. In this lab they weren’t necessary
as the pen drive didn’t contain any file that might have been helpful. However in
cases similar to this one, where there are a large amount of recovered files, eDiscovery
could be helpful to filter by specific key words. (Due to the large amount of files, it
wasn’t possible to upload them to the Github repository)
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Figure 3.17. Recovery Files
Now we will analyze the recovery files, hoping to find any file that will help in
the investigation.
One of the files seemed to contain information related to bitcoin. After looking
at them, we can see some typical files of the Bitcoin wallet, but none seem to be
helpful for this investigation (FIGURE 3.18). The other files obtained from the
recovery don’t seem to be related to Bitcoin or cryptocurrencies.
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Figure 3.18. Recovery log Bitcoin data
In this case, recovering files wasn’t helpful, however, in most cases, most of the
controversial information is often eliminated to hide proof or evidences of a user’s im-
plication in a crime. File carving is a great method for recovering files and fragments
of files when directory entries are corrupt or missing.
In certain cases related to child pornography, law enforcement agents are of-
ten able to recover more images from the suspect’s hard disks by using file carving
techniques. Other situations were law enforcement organization can benefit from file
carving techniques are those related to terrorist warlords. During Osama Bin Laden’s
campus raid, U.S. Navy Seals were able to obtain hard disks and removable storage
media. Forensic experts then used file carving techniques to squeeze every bit of
information out of this media.
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Figure 3.19. Timeline creation
The Timeline analysis (FIGURE 3.19) will give us the following fields from
each file in the destination path:
• File Name
• Path
• Size
• Modified Time
• Access Time
• Created Time
• Owner
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• Group
• Mode
The output of this is a .CSV file. The reason for this lays in the amount of fields
obtained. By using a spreadsheet it is easier to browse through the information than
in any other file extension. This process will help us identify when a file has been
altered and by whom. As explained earlier, this is key to identify any kind of activ-
ity that has taken place in the system or computer paths where the study is being held.
In order to copy the files from the image created from the thumb drive, we will
need to mount the image. To mount the image correctly, we should use the following
commands:
$ sudo mkdir −p /mnt/tmp
$ f d i s k − l /media/ ha l l v a rd r /\_backup/TFM/ r e s u l t s /
copy_image . dd
$ sudo mount −o ro , loop , o f f s e t =1048576 //media/ ha l l v a rd r /
\_backup/TFM/ r e s u l t s /copy_image . dd /mnt/tmp
$ sudo mount | grep /media/ ha l l v a rd r /\_backup/TFM/ r e s u l t s /
copy_image . dd
$ cd /mnt/tmp/
$ cp wa l l e t . dat wa l l e t 1 . dat /media/ ha l l v a rd r /\_backup/
TFM/ r e s u l t s
$ sudo umount /mnt/tmp
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Figure 3.20. Mount image and copy data
We now have the wallet backup copied in a folder, where we can work with
it without the fear of altering the information in it FIGURE 3.20. As explained
before, this files contain the information regarding the private key and the Bitcoin
addresses in it, amongst other things.
62
Figure 3.21. Wallet hash extraction
The output of this script will give us a hash, which is readable by the main
password cracking tools. The input file will be the wallet backup copied from the
image which is stored in: /media/hallvardr/_backup/TFM/results/wallet.dat and
destination of the output hash file: /media/hallvardr/_backup/TFM/results/
wallet_hash.txt.
The hash is the following:
$bitcoin$64$2811bb2df5ae5d1c0430a840f2b8bdd5dd9719ae24bc6b94
a8f7783c9a673ea2$16$1d99e2791eb013ca$222512$96$a8ad33bd5ae1d
bc1e1890c243b8f16e2601f2d2cf96fcaca5c122e542dd5fa40e8bd0992d
4 d109db071bd9c029d6ef82$66$03f fd526b44af f4 f5e1 f3bd0188aa4e1c
d553bb33064899600091018dd3e9d2474
Once the wallet private key hash has been extracted, it is time to crack the
password. In order to crack it and obtain the password behind it, we will call a
system command line which will execute hashcat with the following options.
• -a 0 - (attack mode, Straight)
• -m 11300 - (Mode, Bitcoin/Litecoin)
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• output wallet hash
• rockyou dictionary
• -O - (Optimized-kernel-enable)
• -w 3 - (Workload Profiles, High)
Figure 3.22. Wallet hash crack process
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Figure 3.23. Password crack Process
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Figure 3.24. Password Successfully cracked
We have successfully cracked the password, we can see the password used to en-
crypt the wallet was: popatop. With this, we can decrypt the wallet and dump the
information stored in it (as shown in the lab setup).
After successfully obtaining the wallets password, we can conclude with the work
with the thumb drive image. In order to prove that no information has been altered
during the investigation, we have to hash the image again. The output file can be
found in the following path: /media/hallvardr/_backup/TFM/results/
output_hash.txt (FIGURE 3.25).
66
Figure 3.25. Image after-process hash
In order to corroborate the integrity of the data, we must compare the original
hash from the thumb drive image, with the output hash once the investigation is
completed. In this case we can see that both hashes are equal (see FIGURE 3.14
and FIGURE 3.26)
Figure 3.26. Hash obtained after investigation has been completed
This means that the information used for the investigation has not been tampered
or altered in any way. This point is crucial for the development of the crime report
which must be presented before the court. Any slight alteration between both hashes
would end up in the total invalidation of the proofs and all the work put into the
investigation.
All the outputs obtained during the process described in the laboratory, have
been saved in the results folder, which can bee seen in FIGURE 3.27. Due to size
issues, both copy_image.dd and recovery, were not able to be uploaded to the Github
repository.
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Figure 3.27. Results Folder
3.4.2 Hard Disk Drive Study
The next step will be to study the Bitcoin folder found in the users Hard Disk Drive
(Evidence A.6). Although we presume the files found in the pen drive correspond
to the ones that will be found in the HDD, we must be certain of it. Once we
are able to confirm that the files are the same, and the that the wallet corresponds
to that one, we can confirm that wallet corresponds to that Bitcoin Core account.
Also, during the period between the backup was stored in the thumb drive and the
current investigation of the computer, the target user may have performed any other
transactions. Identifying additional transactions made by the user, may incriminate
him in other cases yet undiscovered, or use programs such as bit clusters to try and
link it to other addresses.
For this part of the process, we will have to repeat the same steps that we
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performed for the files contained in the thumb drive. The first one will be to create
a binary copy of the hard drive and create a hash of it.
Figure 3.28. HDD binary copy
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Figure 3.29. HDD image size
The output of the checksum function will output a file called hashoriginal.txt,
however we changed the name of the file to copy_btc_hash.txt. The hash can be
found in FIGURE 3.30.
Figure 3.30. Hash bitcoin folder image
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Figure 3.31. HDD File carving
Due to a lack of space in the Hard Disk Drive where the investigation results
were being stored, we have skipped this step. We will assume that since the user was
actively using the wallet, he had not deleted any files related to it. A mistake during
any deletion of a wallet can easily end up with the permanent loss of all the addresses
that were stored in that wallet.
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Figure 3.32. HDD Timeline
In order to copy the files from the image created from the Hard Disk Drive, we
will need to mount the image. To mount the image correctly, we should use the
following commands:
$ sudo mkdir −p /mnt/btc
$ sudo f d i s k − l /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/TFM/Bi t co i n_re su l t s /
HDD_copy . dd
$ sudo mount −o ro , loop , o f f s e t =1048576 /media/ ha l l v a rd r /
_backup/TFM/Bi t co in_re su l t s /HDD_copy . dd /mnt/btc /
$ cd /mnt/btc /
72
$ cp wa l l e t . dat wa l l e t 1 . dat /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/
TFM/Bi t co in_re su l t s /
$ sudo umount /mnt/btc
Figure 3.33. Copy wallets found in HDD
We have now got access to the users PC, mounted the image and have navigated
to the Bitcoin folder where all the relevant information has been found. We have
taken a look at the files and found only two wallet files created, both wallet.dat files
correspond in name with the ones found inside the thumb drive.
We will copy the wallet files to /media/hallvardr/_backup/TFM/
Bitcoin_results. The next step will be to try and dump the information stored inside
the wallet. Note that if we are not able to successfully decrypt, "unlock", the wallet
with the password obtained from the previous exercise, it will mean that both wallets
belong to different Bitcoin accounts.
For this last exercise we will need a second computer with the Bitcoin Blockchain
set up in it. This is necessary, since in order to dump the information stored in the
wallet, we need to run Bitcoin’s daemon process and have access to the Blockchain.
For this, we have set up a second computer, also working with KALI Linux, where
we have downloaded Bitcoin’s Blockchain.
If we were to dump the wallets information from the targets bitcoin folder, we
would automatically invalidate the whole investigation. The reason for this lies in
that, in order to dump the information stored in the wallet, we have to execute Bit-
coin’s daemon, which will look up for any new blocks in the blockchain and start
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updating any missing information. This will mean that the original hash of the Bit-
coin folder and the output hash will not be identical. Hence, two different hashes will
not stand before any court, and will make useless any work done in the investigation.
Going back to the lab setup, the necessary commands to dump the wallets in-
formation will be the following:
$ b i t c o i nd −daemon
$ b i t co in−c l i wa l l e tpa s sphra s e popatop 120
$ b i t co in−c l i dumpwallet dump . txt
Figure 3.34. Wallet dump found in HDD
If the process of dumping the wallet is satisfactory, then we can confirm that
the information found in the pen drive was valid and corresponded to that Bitcoin
account. This will allow us to skip steps 5 and 6 of the tool, since we have already
performed them with success earlier in the investigation.
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Figure 3.35. HDD Bitcoin wallet dump
As we can see, the wallet has been dumped successfully and the bitcoin addresses
correspond to the ones in the lab set up. Therefore we can determine that indeed
both wallets corresponded to the same Bitcoin account and that the address found
can be related to the target. During the de-anonymization process, we identified
that this address addr=34ZUdU5mWqT4frvQC9YMebNhrS8iVYg2Xo was linked to
the following IP address: 2.152.6X.XXX. As we can identify in the wallet dump
imag, the Bitcoin address identified corresponds to one of the addresses in the tar-
gets wallet. If we had to requisition the criminal’s Satoshis or Bitcoins, we can
find inside the wallet dump the private key associated to each address that be-
longs to the wallet. In this case, the private key that corresponds to the address
is:L1xPiLAtaJGNFPe9xwrRE2baMCH8DRrikLqSXeLfGqPCugXemGLg.
This will conclude with a successful investigation and a valid defense before the
court, making the evidences provided valid and incriminatory.
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Figure 3.36. Hash HDD
After we have finished working with the image, we will hash it again to cor-
roborate the file has not been tampered in any way. We must compare the original
hash from the hard disk drive image, with the output hash once the investigation is
completed. In this case we can see that both hashes are equal (see FIGURE 3.30
and 3.37).
Figure 3.37. HDD image hash
This means that the information used for the investigation has not been tampered
or altered in any way. This point is crucial for the development of the crime report
which must be presented before the court. Any slight alteration between both hashes
would end up in the total invalidation of the proofs and all the work put into the
investigation.
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Figure 3.38. Bitcoin results folder
All the outputs obtained during the process described in the HDD laboratory
part, have been saved in /_backup/TFM/Bitcoin_results, as well as in the Github
repository. Due to size issues, both HDD_copy.dd and recovery, were not able to be
uploaded to Github.
The last step in an investigation is to present a chain of custody of all the
evidences found and used during the process. We have simulated a typical Digital
Forensic chain of custody table, where all the evidences use have been detailed. Taking
into consideration the item model or any possible marks that can help identify it.
Also, it is important to note down the date the item was borrowed for investigation,
by whom and where the item was found.
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Figure 3.39. Chain of Custody
The items corresponding to those in the Chain of Custody can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
All the work performed during the proof of concept, all the images, files, screen-
shots or any piece of information obtained, is crucial for the chain of custody. It is
important to maintain the chain of custody to preserve the integrity of the evidence
and prevent it from contamination. Any contamination or minimal change occurred
during the investigation, can alter the state of the evidence. If not preserved, the
evidence presented in court might be challenged and ruled inadmissible.
Suppose that we obtain metadata for a piece of evidence. However, we are unable
to extract meaningful information from it, that will help refute the investigation
hypothesis. The fact that there is no meaningful information within the metadata
does not mean that the evidence is insufficient, there is always relevant information
laying around. The chain of custody in this case helps show where the possible
evidence might lie, where it came from, who created it, and the type of equipment
that was used.
It is possible to have the evidence presented in court dismissed if there is a
missing link in the chain of custody. In this example, if any of the media used to
extract data were to go missing, the court with high certainty would invalidate the
investigation resources presented. It is therefore important to ensure that a wholesome
and meaningful chain of custody is presented along with the evidence at the court.
3.4.3 Hash cracking
Cracking these wallets can be fairly hardware-intensive, especially when using really
long wordlists. Since bitcoin hash is harder to compute than other common hashes
such as MD5 or SHA-256, it is recommended to have a GPU Rig setup for the task.
The performance obtained by this hardware build, is much higher than the one a CPU
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could achieve. The following tables compare the performance of some of the most
common GPUs at the time and the CPU used for the laboratory, and the hashrate
obtained for bitcoin hash cracking.
NVIDIA NVIDIA AMD AMD
Device GTX1080 TITAN Vega 64 (Air) FX-8350
Hash/s Bitcoin/Litecoin wallet.dat 4439 8938 4779 89
Length of Password Time required in hours
1 3,879753E-06 1,926854E-06 3,603729E-06 1,935081E-04
2 2,405447E-04 1,194650E-04 2,234312E-04 1,199750E-02
3 1,491377E-02 7,406827E-03 1,385274E-02 7,438452E-01
4 9,246537E-01 4,592233E-01 8,588696E-01 4,611840E+01
5 5,732853E+01 2,847184E+01 5,324991E+01 2,859341E+03
6 3,554369E+03 1,765254E+03 3,301495E+03 1,772791E+05
7 2,203709E+05 1,094458E+05 2,046927E+05 1,099131E+07
8 1,366299E+07 6,785638E+06 1,269095E+07 6,814610E+08
9 8,471056E+08 4,207095E+08 7,868386E+08 4,225058E+10
10 5,252055E+10 2,608399E+10 4,878400E+10 2,619536E+12
11 3,256274E+12 1,617207E+12 3,024608E+12 1,624112E+14
12 2,018890E+14 1,002669E+14 1,875257E+14 1,006950E+16
13 1,251712E+16 6,216545E+15 1,162659E+16 6,243088E+17
14 7,760613E+17 3,854258E+17 7,208487E+17 3,870715E+19
15 4,811580E+19 2,389640E+19 4,469262E+19 2,399843E+21
16 2,983180E+21 1,481577E+21 2,770942E+21 1,487903E+23
17 1,849571E+23 9,185776E+22 1,717984E+23 9,224997E+24
18 1,146734E+25 5,695181E+24 1,065150E+25 5,719498E+26
19 7,109752E+26 3,531012E+26 6,603932E+26 3,546089E+28
20 4,408046E+28 2,189228E+28 4,094438E+28 2,198575E+30
Table 3.1. Time required to bruteforce a password of 62 possible characters.
79
NVIDIA NVIDIA AMD AMD
Device GTX1080 TITAN Vega 64 (Air) FX-8350
Hash/s Bitcoin/Litecoin wallet.dat 4439 8938 4779 89
Length of Password Time required in hours
1 0,0000059 0,0000029 0,0000055 0,0002934
2 0,0005529 0,0002746 0,0005136 0,0275780
3 0,0519752 0,0258131 0,0482774 2,5923346
4 4,8856659 2,4264344 4,5380772 243,6794507
5 459,2525984 228,0848383 426,5792602 22905,8683645
6 43169,7442527 21439,9747972 40098,4504578 2153151,6262672
7 4,0579559598E+06 2,0153576309E+06 3,7692543430E+06 2,0239625287E+08
8 3,8144786022E+08 1,8944361731E+08 3,5430990825E+08 1,9025247770E+10
9 3,5856098860E+10 1,7807700027E+10 3,3305131375E+10 1,7883732904E+12
10 3,3704732929E+12 1,6739238025E+12 3,1306823493E+12 1,6810708929E+14
11 3,1682448953E+14 1,5734883744E+14 2,9428414083E+14 1,5802066394E+16
12 2,9781502016E+16 1,4790790719E+16 2,7662709238E+16 1,4853942410E+18
13 2,7994611895E+18 1,3903343276E+18 2,6002946684E+18 1,3962705865E+20
14 2,6314935181E+20 1,3069142680E+20 2,4442769883E+20 1,3124943513E+22
15 2,4736039070E+22 1,2284994119E+22 2,2976203690E+22 1,2337446903E+24
16 2,3251876726E+24 1,1547894472E+24 2,1597631468E+24 1,1597200088E+26
17 2,1856764123E+26 1,0855020803E+26 2,0301773580E+26 1,0901368083E+28
18 2,0545358275E+28 1,0203719555E+28 1,9083667165E+28 1,0247285998E+30
19 1,9312636779E+30 9,5914963818E+29 1,7938647136E+30 9,6324488383E+31
20 1,8153878572E+32 9,0160065989E+31 1,6862328307E+32 9,0545019080E+33
Table 3.2. Time required to bruteforce a password of 94 possible characters.
Bruteforce attacks are the simplest to put into practice, as the machine tries
every single combination with the amount of characters set. This attack is the most
complete, however is the most time and resource consuming, as it’s not configured
with any type of intelligence at all. In most cases, bruteforce attacks are left for
passwords that are known to be formed with very few characters.
Due to the stated above, hash cracking experts relay on dictionary attacks. Most
dictionaries are crucial in hash cracking, as they have registered most of the common
words, as well as already used passwords. The most important hacker teams focused
in hash cracking, own very extent dictionaries, with billions of words in it. Most of
this words can be found in language dictionaries, extracts from the Wikipedia, but the
biggest contributor, are leaks from other hackers that have performed SQL attacks
to websites databases and have extracted the passwords stored in them.
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Figure 3.40. AMD CPU hashing computational power testing
As we can see, the hashrate obtained with the laboratory setup is quite low.
In a real case scenario, where passwords are arbitrary and in most cases can not be
found in most dictionaries, forensic examiners have to make use of hashing rules. This
rules create new combinations of words by mixing existent words in a dictionary, in
a specific way determined by the rule specification. Lets suppose a dictionary with
900000 entries in it. We decide to use a rule that tries all possible combinations with
a degree of two words. This is, for every single word, we will add at the end of it each
word in the dictionary.
Total combinations : 900000 ∗ 900000 = 810000000000 combinations
The total time required to complete all the possible combinations in both cases will
be the following:
No rule : 900000/87 = 10344, 83 seconds
Using rule : 810000000000/87 = 9310344828 seconds
As we can see, using extra methods to achieve better results imply spending a
higher amount of time, which in many times is crucial to advance in an investigation.
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NVIDIA NVIDIA AMD AMD
GPU GTX1080 TITAN Vega 64 (Air) FX-8350
Hash/s Bitcoin/Litecoin wallet.dat 4439 8938 4779 89
Number of words Time Required in seconds
Crackstation - 1493677782 336489,7 167115 312550,27 16782896,43
Rockyou - 932102 209,9801757 104,2852987 195,041222 10473,05618
Table 3.3. Time required to run over two well known Password Cracking Dictionar-
ies.
In TABLE 3.3 we can observe the difference in computational power that can
be achieved by using GPUs instead of CPUs to crack hashes. This output can be
increased by creating GPU Rigs to crack hashes.
Figure 3.41. Mining Rig setup - https://www.flickr.com/photos/bitcoin-
crypto/32107355744
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
Although we have identified several ways of de-anonimizing users in both the standard
network and TOR network, it is still very cost efficient and difficult to identify them.
Exploiting regular internet failures can give us fairly nice results with very little
effort, however, the kind of users we are trying to identify do not operate in the
regular network.
Attacks on the Bitcoin network are easy to perform, as most of them come from
P2P network vulnerabilities, however the amount of resources required to successfully
de-anonymize a user are accessible to very few organizations. The 51% attack is
probably the most common, and which is only applicable to Blockchain networks.
The Onion Router network provides the most robust anonymity, thanks to its
layer based encryption mechanism. But this is still not 100% safe from attacks. Sim-
ilar to Blockchain attacks (and P2P attacks), in order to fully de-anonymize a user,
the attacker needs to own a large amount of TOR relays to obtain any valid output.
The FBI is probably the best know attacker in this network, since it has already
performed successful attacks in the past.
Once we have gained access to the users PC, extracting the information needed
can seem fairly easy. However, if the criminal has a minimum concern for security,
most of the relevant files will have been eliminated or encrypted. For this reason it
is important to take into consideration techniques such as file carving, although, the
most important aspect of all is probably password (hash) cracking. If we want to
make sure we are able to crack any hashes we might encounter, it is important to own
a very good dictionary. In order to get onto a decent dicctionary, it is necessary to
continuously update it with any password leaks, add words from different languages
or develop good rules to form any possible combination with the words sTORed in
it. This are some of the ideas to keep a good dicctionary up to date. A ver good
example is Crackstation’s dictionary, however, most hackers have their own one built
up for their needs.
It is important to notice that once you have completely and successfully identified
a Bitcoin address to a specific user, this can be very helpful to link any future crimes.
By using a transition or cluster graph, any transaction made by this users (this
includes all the Bitcoin addresses linked to this user’s wallet), can be useful to correlate
him to other criminals (such as Coin mixing services, ilegal goods marketplace, hitman
services and so on). By the creation of a "map", slowly but steadily, a security
department can get to link criminals to specific Bitcoin addresses.
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There are some companies that work in restoring users Bitcoin wallets or ad-
dresses (such as Btcrecover, recoverbitcoin, bitcoinrecovery, walletrecovery, etc.),
which support several wallet applications. The main objective of this companies
is to recover the password a Bitcoin user lost or forgot and therefore can not access
it’s Bitcoins anymore.
However, this companies centre themselves in password recovery, they don’t fol-
low any Forensic process. If there were a case, in which a user had been stolen, this
services would not be useful if the user was to denounce the criminal who illegally
took the cryptocurrencies.
Finally, this study was performed for a user that operates with Bitcoin and uses
Bitcoin Core wallet. It could be extended by focusing rather on the multiple wallet
applications available. It would be possible to develop scripts that could operate for
mobile applications or web services. Another option would be to centre the study on
other cryptocurrencies, such as Ethereum or Monero. This last one could be of more
interest since it is gaining higher adoption in the Deep Web thanks to its natural
transaction obfuscation. Remember that there are more than a thousand existent
cryptocurrencies, so there is not a unique option.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Source Code and Evidences
The Script code and all the outputs can be found in the following GitHub link:
https://github.com/Hallvardr/TFM
The following pictures have been taken from the evidences found in the targets
home.
Figure A.1. Pen drives bag found in targets home
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Figure A.2. Item 1, front
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Figure A.3. Item 1, back
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Figure A.4. Item 2, Kingston SSD (root files)
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Figure A.5. Item 3, Seagate HDD (home files)
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Figure A.6. Item 4, unknown pendrives
Figure A.7. Pendrive with wallet.dat files in it
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Appendix B
WIF Encoding
Private key to WIF
• 1 - Take a private key:
0C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE89827
E19D72AA1D
• 2 - Add a 0x80 byte in front of it for mainnet addresses or 0xef for testnet
addresses. Also add a 0x01 byte at the end if the private key will correspond
to a compressed public key:
800C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE898
27E19D72AA1D
• 3 - Perform SHA-256 hash on the extended key
8147786C4D15106333BF278D71DADAF1079EF2D2440A4DDE37D747
DED5403592
• 4 - Perform SHA-256 hash on result of SHA-256 hash
507A5B8DFED0FC6FE8801743720CEDEC06AA5C6FCA72B07C499644
92FB98A714
• 5 - Take the first 4 bytes of the second SHA-256 hash, this is the checksum
507A5B8D
• 6 - Add the 4 checksum bytes from point 5 at the end of the extended key from
point 2
800C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE8982
7E19D72AA1D507A5B8D
• 7 - Convert the result from a byte string into a base58 string using Base58Check
encoding. This is the Wallet Import Format
5HueCGU8rMjxEXxiPuD5BDku4MkFqeZyd4dZ1jvhTVqvbTLvyTJ
WIF to private key
• 1 - Take a Wallet Import Format string
5HueCGU8rMjxEXxiPuD5BDku4MkFqeZyd4dZ1jvhTVqvbTLvyTJ
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• 2 - Convert it to a byte string using Base58Check encoding
800C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE8982
7E19D72AA1D507A5B8D
• 3 - Drop the last 4 checksum bytes from the byte string
800C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE8982
7E19D72AA1D
• 4 - Drop the first byte (it should be 0x80). If the private key corresponded
to a compressed public key, also drop the last byte (it should be 0x01). If it
corresponded to a compressed public key, the WIF string will have started with
K or L instead of 5 (or c instead of 9 on testnet). This is the private key.
0C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE89827E
19D72AA1D
WIF checksum checking
• 1 - Take the Wallet Import Format string
5HueCGU8rMjxEXxiPuD5BDku4MkFqeZyd4dZ1jvhTVqvbTLvyTJ
• 2 - Convert it to a byte string using Base58Check encoding
800C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE8982
7E19D72AA1D507A5B8D
• 3 - Drop the last 4 checksum bytes from the byte string
800C28FCA386C7A227600B2FE50B7CAE11EC86D3BF1FBE471BE8982
7E19D72AA1D
• 3 - Perform SHA-256 hash on the shortened string
8147786C4D15106333BF278D71DADAF1079EF2D2440A4DDE37D747D
ED5403592
• 4 - Perform SHA-256 hash on result of SHA-256 hash
507A5B8DFED0FC6FE8801743720CEDEC06AA5C6FCA72B07C49964492
FB98A714
• 5 - Take the first 4 bytes of the second SHA-256 hash, this is the checksum
507A5B8D
• 6 - Make sure it is the same, as the last 4 bytes from point 2
507A5B8D
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Appendix C
Commands Used
$ sudo apt−get i n s t a l l python−p y f i g l e t
$ b i t c o i nd −daemon
$ b i t co in−c l i enc ryptwa l l e t popatop
$ b i t co in−c l i wa l l e tpa s sphra s e popatop 120
$ b i t co in−c l i dumpwallet /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/
TFM/ r e s u l t s / wa l l e t \_dump. txt
$ b i t co in−c l i −datad i r=/home/ ha l l v a rd r /Documents/
b i t co in −0.17.1 stop
$ python TFM_Alvaro . py
$ sudo mkdir −p /mnt/tmp
$ f d i s k − l /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/TFM/ r e s u l t s /
copy_image . dd
$ sudo mount −o ro , loop , o f f s e t =1048576 /media/ ha l l v a rd r /
_backup/TFM/ r e s u l t s /copy_image . dd /mnt/tmp
$ sudo mount | grep /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/TFM/
r e s u l t s /copy_image . dd
$ cd /mnt/tmp/
$ cp wa l l e t . dat wa l l e t 1 . dat /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/
TFM/ r e s u l t s /
$ sudo umount /mnt/tmp
$ sudo mkdir −p /mnt/btc
$ f d i s k − l /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/
TFM/Bi t co in_re su l t s / bitcoin_image . dd
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$ sudo mount −o ro , loop , o f f s e t =1048576 /media/ ha l l v a rd r /
_backup/TFM/Bi t co in_re su l t s / bitcoin_image . dd /mnt/btc
$ sudo mount | grep /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/
TFM/Bi t co in_re su l t s / bitcoin_image . dd
$ cd /mnt/btc /
$ cp wa l l e t . dat wa l l e t 1 . dat /media/ ha l l v a rd r /_backup/
TFM/Bi t co in_re su l t s
$ sudo umount /mnt/btc
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Appendix D
Bitcoin Brainwallet addresses used
Used addresses:
• Address A: 18MxiJrPcTVHSVmQJTRmYY6JYP3gGCxmCD
• Address B: 1KWXjyV3JAedCUmttr6e4x5fUKfJybzmw2
• Address C: 1Nc56SToGYnM3rUFkb6jkNcMvmST7fdiSE
• Address D: 1FiKrcvU7fa2ukvhchUvoxzv9aeQRksMJB
• Address E: 1eXpcNAda3VSpFKThPYXH7XD9BMtnRgro
• Address F: 1JfGtyFXLV2g8e9Zjikidzcq9AwyGVmsvU
• Address G: 18xxAK2tooecE9Mzyi2LzfBfFAJ4xJiZiW
• Address H: 1ECPYEfD1CuUhgQxDDkiUX21iHnGk2vzxu
• Address I: 1ACS8DMFXRpXC75vLrPykLnnqtQBoyVjun
• Address T: 1JG6z9FC6eCPmEJxbPqENUKCwn2y6ietxW
Brainwallet compressed addresses, private keys are:
• A: al pan pan y al vino vino
• B: esta es una contraseña de prueba
• C: tres tristes tigres comen trigo en un trigal
• D: la he liado parda
• E: un dia vi una vaca vestida de uniforme
• F: murcia es la mejor tierra del mundo
• G: never use password as your password
• H: 123456 is the worst possible password
• I: use rockyou.txt for a fast check
• T: this is a bad passphrase
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